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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
oTATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 19221
FJCBARD H. NICKLES and
MAJ;GARET K. NICKLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented in this appeal:
1.

Was sufficient evidence presented at tri2l to

support the jury's finding that defendar.ts were guilty of
aggravated arson and insurance fraud?
2.

Did the trial court erroneously

ad~it

evidence of a

telephone conversation Eileen Rice testified she had with Richard
1;1ckles after his house burned?
3.

Were defendants denied a fair trial by the

adc-ission of allegedly inadmissible evidence?
4.

Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the

iury that a conviction for insurance fraud requires more than
t~ccurate

estimates?
5.

Does the existence of an alleged conflict of

11;terc:st at the time of trial on the pert of the deputy county
attorney who prosecuted defendants require granting defendants a
ne~trial?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants, Richard and Margaret Nickles, were charged
information with aggravated arson, a second desree felony,

under UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-6-103 (1978), and insurance fraud, a
second degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN.
19-22).

§

76-6-521 (1978)

(R.

After a jury trial, defendants were found guilty as

charged CR. 91-94).
The trial court sentenced Richard Nickles to a term of
1-15 years in the Utah State Prison for both aggravated arson and
insurance fraud, the two sentences to run concurrently.

Mr.

Nickles was also ordered to pay a $10,000 fine for each offense
and to make restitution to Capitol Thrift and Loan in the amount
of $63,361.91 (R. 142-143).

The court sentenced Mrs. Nickles to

a term of 1-15 years in the Utah State Prison for both aggravatEd
arson and insurance fraud, the two sentences to run concurrently,
and ordered her to pay a $5,000 fine for aggravated arson and to
make restitution in the amount of $63,361.91 to Capitol Thrift
and Loan.

However, the court stayed execution of Mrs. Nickles's

sentence and placed her on conditional Frobation CR. 149-50).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts, which support the jury's verdict,
are derived from the evidence presented at trial.
In the early morning hours of October 30, 1980 while
defendants and their two daughters were away in California, an
explosion and fire occurred at defendants' residence located on
Crest Oak Drive in Salt Lake County (R. 275-76, 316-18).

Windows

in a neighbor's house were blown out and glass from defendants'
house was hurled onto the roofs and into the yards of nearby
houses (R. 297, 429).

The house directly south of defendants'

was singed by the flames (R. 297).

-2-

When firemen arrived just

after the blaze began, defendants' house was engulfed in

~ 1 nutes

flames

(R 276, 398).

The fire was extremely hot and very

difficult to extinguish (R. 306, 402, 406).
A subsequent investigation of the fire scene by the
salt Lake County Fire Department and the Arson Task Force of the
salt Lake County Attorney's Office uncovered evidence of arson.
JiivEstigators located five points of the fire's origin and
extensive "pour patterns"
IR. 785-86,

(or "trailers")l throughout the house

843-48, 1057, 1064-67).

A "device" consisting of a

light bulb imbedded in a large amount of newspaper ash with an
electrical wire running from the base of the light bulb socket to
an electrical outlet in the wall was found on the floor of a
basement bedroom belonging to Kimberly Nickles, one of
defendants' daughters (R. 1067-68).

"Trailers" were observed

which led out of Kimberly's bedroom, into a hallway, continuing
3ga1n at the top of a set of stairs, into the master bedroom, and
OJt into an area towards the front of the house

(R. 1030-33).

"Trailers" and "puddle areas•2 were also apparent upstairs in the
living room area and family room (R. 1033).
The window and its frame in Kimberly's bedroom had been
blown out

(R. 986).

A section of the aluminum frame of a sliding

door located near the upstairs family room had melted (R. 1059).

'Pour patterns" or "trailers" were terms used by arson
investigors to refer to visible signs of a flammable liquid that
•as present on the floor of the house prior to the fire.
'Puddle area" was another term used by arson investigators to
the visible signs of a flammable liquid referred to in
tr,utnote l, ~·

1escribe
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Investigators found several acetone-soaked suitcases under a
stairwell in the basement area (R. 978-79, 1075-76, 1178).

Pom-

porns that had been hanging in Kimberly's bedroom and pieces of
drape material were recovered approximately seventy feet fr om the
back wall of defendants' home (R. 984).

Broken glass covered

defendants' backyard and the neighbor's house and yard <R. 994).
Dave Magana, a fireman with the Salt Lake County Fire
Department who had been trained as an arson investigator and who
coordinated the investigation of the fire at defendants' home (R.
1054-56), testified that the pour patterns in the house and thE
melted section of the sliding glass door frame that he observed
were indications that a flammable liquid had been poured on the
floor of defendants' house prior to the fire (R. 1059-60, 1064).
Signs of an explosion that he saw were not consistent with a
natural gas explosion (R. 1062, 1095) .3

However, he stated that

a •wet-type" explosion, which is associated with flammable
liquids, is likely to produce "instant fire of great magnitude"
(R. 1096).

He further identified the "device" found in

Kimberly's bedroom as one commonly used by arsonists to ignite a
fire (R. 1075).

He distinguished the device frcm a lamp because

it was found at a point of fire origin and appeared to be wrapped
in a roll of paper resembling newspaper CR. 1075).
3 Several other investigators also testified that they saw no
signs of a natural gas explosion (R. 618, 761-62). Furthermore,
the testimony of Demoin Christensen, a service foreman for
Mountain Fuel Supply, and John Ungricht, a battalion chief and
investigator with the Salt Lake County Fire Department, indicated
that no signs of swamp gas were observed and that the explosion
at defendants' residence probably was not caused by swamp gas (R.
635-38, 819, 831-33, 855).
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Steve Roberts, a chemist employed with the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF"J having expertise concerning
[lammable liquids and in the examination of debris from
suspicious fires (T. 1161-63), testified that his tests on the
linings from the suitcases recovered in defendants' house
indicated that a rather large concentration of acetone was
present CR. 1175, 1178).

He observed that acetone vapors could

cause an explosion, but that acetone is not so volatile that one
could not pour it around a room or house without causing an
immediate explosion (R. 1192, 1195).
Jerry Taylor, an employee of ATF with expertise in
explosive and incendiary devices, testified that in his
exa!7lination of the "device" found in Kimberly's bedroor, he
~'ticed

several factors that concernec hh1 as an explosives

expert (R. 1280-81).

Specifically, he noted:

The aggregate exhibit had some very
unique i ndi ca tors in it. One of them
was the placement of a light bulb in and
around combustible material in the form
of paper and magazines, which in turn
was inside of a tray.
I noticed inunediately that the
light bulb had some type of stain on it,
or the glass did, such as you would find
if you had combustible material and
maybe flanunable materials burned onto
the glass itself that would stain.
I also noticed that the heat had
caused a formation into the device
itself.
In the other exhibit, there was a
very good outline of a socket--light
bulb, where the light bulb had been in
one--had !sic] wasn't broken when it was
down there and burned for some time and
melted to cause a recession.
I noticed
wires coming off. They were not broken.
I couldn't ascertain whether or not they
were plugged into the socket because
-5-

other testing had been done by the
laboratory, but I was told that it had
been plugged in.
I noticed that the carpet, as
said before, around it was burned, but
when I peeled the device off the carpet
the carpet was in good shape. That is
highly unusual for the carpet, if there
had been a fire and then the device
falling on it.
(R.

1281-82).
Mr. Taylor further testified that from his review of

the reports of defendants' fire he concluded that "there indeed
was a violent explosion most probably as a result of flammable
liquids vaporizing" (R. 1282).

The explosion, followed

immediately by a hot fire which engulfed the entire residence,
indicated that flammable liquids were burning (R. 1282-83).

Mr.

Taylor stated:
Having talked to the fire investigators where they noticed several hot
spots and recognized several flammable
trailers, this all fit in with the device,
trailer leading from the device, that's
one of the points of origin or the
initial point where the explosion and
fire started.

CR. 1283).

He concluded that the light bulb object was Pot simply

a lamp, but rather a device that had been used to start a fire c:nc'
to burn defendants' residence CR. 1304, 1322).

It was the type of

device that would allow for delayed ignition and thus facilitate
the creation of an alibi IR. 1307-08).
Prior to the fire at defendants' home, the following
occurred.

In early July 1980, Dean Larsen, the Fire Marshal and

Captain of the Murray City Fire Department, visited a busines!:

ir.

the Murray area called Composter Corporation which was operated by
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Nickles.

Mr.

~, 1 ckles

He went there in response to a request from Mr.

who was concerned about certain tenants in adjacent

r"ildings (R.686).
,0

Specifically, Nickles told Larsen that he was

ncerned that the operators of a particular boat business, who

were experiencing financial problems, might try to burn down the
,,uilding that housed their business.

Larsen was not aware of any

;ttempt s by the boat ma nu fact u rer s to burn down that bu il ding.

In

rEspcnse to Nickles' s question to him about what products the boat
c.anufacturers had in their possession that could be used to set
fires, Larsen suggested that acetone likely could be used (R. 687881.

Although he visited Composter Corporation at least five

times during July and August, Larsen never saw an ongoing business
tnere--no workers and no office staff CR. 689).
On August 13, 1980, Capitol Thrift and Loan loaned
:omposter Corporation $75,000.

The note was signed by defendants

.ndividually and by Mr. Nickles as president of the corporation.
home was put up as security for the loan.

~fendants'

The

Lepayment schedule consisted of six monthly i11terest payments of
s_,375 each,

43, 651).

the principle to accompany the sixth payment CR. 641-

Defendants' check for the first payment, which was

received October 2, 1980, bounced.

A second check from defendants

>as also returned; however, defendants were able to provide an
explanation for why this occurred CR. 646-47, 655-56).
time of defendants'
'l 375
;

in

At the

trial, the loan company had received only

payments from defendants on the outstanding note CR.

').
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At various times during 1980, defendants' house was
for sale CR. 525, 529).

U[,

Alice Blair, a real estate agent for

Century 21, testified that she had the house listed from October
3-30 of that year for a price of $239,000, but had not shown it to
anyone or had any interested buyers CR. 513, 525).

Another real

estate agent, who had defendants' house listed earlier in the
year, similarly had no offers or inquiries on the home CR. 55759).

For the period that Ms. Blair had the hoLse listed,

~rs.

Nickles declined to give her a key to it because Mrs. Nickles
claimed that a complex burglar alcrm system had bee!' installed (R.
517).

However, Ms. Blair never saw such a system CR. 519).

Also,

she was unable to arrange an or€ri house for defendants' home,
although she attempted to do this with Mrs. Nickles on at least
four successive weekends, including the weekend defendants were to
be in California CR. 518).
Defendants had always maintained an expensive
•cadillac• insurance policy on their home CR. 928).
1978, coverage on the house was $150,000.

In December

By September 1979,

built-in inflation allowances had increased it to $165,000.

In

January 1980, pursuant to defendants' request, coverage was
increased to $250,000 (R. 946-48).

This increase apparently was

requested to account for refurbishing of the home CR. 967).

In

early October 1980, Mrs. Nickles contacted her agent at
Transwestern Insurance Agency and requested that a "rider" for
silverware be placed on defendants' policy CR. 944, 952, 968).
Per that request,

a silver rider in the amount of $17 ,280 becar,e

effective on October 10, 1980

(R.
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923, 952).

Agents at the

1 nsurance

company never saw the silver or received an a ppr ai sal on

!R. 922, 956).

1t

Several days before October 30, the date of the

fne, Margaret Nickles, her two daughters, and the family's two
~gs

left in defendants' station wagon for a trip to California

iR. 1865-67).

Richard Nickles planned to fly to southern

ialifornia later and meet his family in Santa Maria after he
attended a business meeting in Los Angeles (R. 1866).
On the evening of October 28, Mr. Nickles telephoned
cinda Dickert, a neighbor, and told her that he had a casserole he
wished to give her because he would be leaving at noon the next
day to join his family in California (R. 312-13).

When Ms.

Dickert' s fourteen-year-old son, David, went over to defendants'
nouse to pick up the casserole, he found it sitting on a flower
box (R. 316, 356-57).
1

He did not go into the house, but saw Mr.

Nickles through a window by the front door when Mr. Nickles told
n1m

where the casserole was (R. 357).

David also observed one of

defendants' cars with its trunk open backed up in the driveway
approximately ten feet from a door (R. 358-59).
not see or smell anything unusual at the time

(R.

However, he did
358-59).

>ever al days before the fire, David had spoken with Mrs. Nickles
to make arrangements for the care of defendants' cat while they
were away (R. 355).

Although defendants had previously given him

a key to the house when he cared for their pets, on this occasion
they did not give him a key and instead placed the cat's food and
bowls outside the front door (R. 356).
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on October 29 when Ms.
',

1

ckert was about to go to bed, she noticed that the lights were
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on in nearly every room of defendants' house.

However, she did

not see any movement or activity in the house (R. 315).

Ms.

Dickert also testified that she had heard defendants talk about
acetone in connection with their business, that she had seen a
gallon container of acetone in defendants' home, and that Mrs.
Nickles had offered to lend her acetone, saying that she had it by
the barrelful (R. 322-23, 337-38).
On the morning of the fire at approximately 8:00 a.m.,
John Minichino, a special agent for ATF and a member of the Salt
Lake County Special Arson Fire Enforcement Unit, contacted Mr.
Nickles in California and told him about the explosion and fire at
defendants' residence.

Mr. Nickles first inquired whether anyone

had been hurt or killed (R. 720-21).

However, when asked by

Minichino to return to Salt Lake City, Mr. Nickles responded,
"What the fuck do I have to come back [to Salt Lake City] for
now?" (R. 742l.

He indicated that he would not be back in Salt

Lake City until November 1, 1980, and that he would be driving
back with his family (R. 721).
Defendants arrived back in Salt Lake City at
approximately 12:30 a.m. on November 2.
Mr. Nickles the following day

(R.

Mr. Minichino interviewed

721, 724).

In that interview,

Mr. Nickles indicated that he left Salt Lake City for California
on Wednesday, October 29, at 11:50 a.m.

Only two families knew

about his travel plans, and no one had been given keys to the
house <R. 726).

Al though the house had been on the market in the

past one and one-half years and as recently as three or four
months prior to the fire, none of the realtors had keys to the
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nouse.

The real estate companies had been informed that a burglar

alarm system had been installed, al though such a system had not
0

ctually been hooked up (R. 731-32).

Certain valuables had been

removed from the house due to fears of a possible burglary.
Personal papers and birth certificates had been taken out of a
house vault and some sterling silver placed inside (R. 728-30).
~uring

the interview, Mr. Nickles also mentioned that gasoline

could not have been used to start the fire, and asked Minichino
whether a timing device had been found

(R. 725).

On December 30, 1980, defendants submitted a proof-of!oss statement of between 100 and 200 pages in making a claim to
the Great American Insurance Company, the company with which
defendants had a homeowner's insurance policy (R. 458, 865-66,
'.428).

The proof-of-loss statement, which listed approximately

1700 items, made a claim of $233,353.29 for the house, $134,000
:or contents, $53,600 for loss of use, $12,876 for silver, $3,800
for fur, $6,500 for landscape, and $360 for other structures (R.
553,1378).

Aaron Nelson, an attorney who took sworn statements
crom defendants on behalf of Great American Insurance Company in
connection with the proof of loss statement defendants submitted,
'estified that Mr. Nickles indicated to him that on the date of
the fire he was not employed (R. 1374-76, 1379).

Prior to the

fire, Mr. Nickles had a number of jobs including recent ownership
ot Compost er Corporation; however, that company had never made any
'ales and had never received any income.

Mrs. Nickles maintained

tnat she sold a number of bins for the company, but that she had
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no idea of how much income had been earned CR. 1380-81).

Mrs.

Nickles apparently was not employed in any capacity for at least
nine years prior to the fire CR. 1384).

Although Mr. Nickles

claimed he never had a checking account, Mrs. Nickles indicated
that she had one and that she had purchased nearly every item
listed in the proof-of-loss statement CR. 1393).
Mr. Nelson could not recall receiving a single receipt
for any of the items defendants claimed were lost in the fire CR.
1387).

Specifically, he never received any proofs of purchase for

the Grand Baroque sterling silverware defendants claimed had been
lost CR. 1392).

Nor was he ever shown any silver, although

defendants indicated that six of the twelve place settings of
silverware they owned had been removed from a vault in the house
after the fire CR. 1392, 1399, 1449).

Both defendants claimed

that the silverware had been purchased at ZCMI, Cottonwood Mall
(R.

1400).
Calvin Miller, an insurance adjuster with General

Adjustment Bureau Can independent insurance adjusting firm),
testified that he met with several people, including defendants,
on March 31 and April 1, 1981, to inspect defendants' house CR.
1499-1501).

He was there to assist in verifying the personal

property items listed by defendants in their claim to the
insurance company CR. 1503).

He specifically looked for silver,
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but found none (R. 1512). 4

He observed an empty floor safe in

which defendants claimed to have stored some their silverware, but
defendants never showed him any of that silverware CR. 1514-15).
Miller did not see any business records or cancelled checks in the
debris CR. 1509).

Although there was evidence that some items

claimed by defendants had actually existed, such as various pieces
of furniture in the master bedroom, numerous items of the greatest
value were not found and were frequently said by defendants to
have been in areas where the fire had burned most intensely CR.
i513l.

Also, no signs of silver spoons, a coin collection, or

iewelry items allegedly located in Kimberly's bedroom were found
IR. 1506).

Mark Ingersoll, another employee of General Adjustment
Bureau who was at the scene of the fire on March 31 and April 1,
testified that at best only fifty per cent of the items claimed by
defendants in their proof-of-loss statement were located (R. 162224, 1647).

For example, he was unable to find any signs of

leather or fur items, silverware, camera equipment, or binoculars
:P. 1627-29, 1633).

However, he thought that a silver tray was

recovered, and he remembered seeing the remains of an oil painting
ar.d what appeared to be an expensive fireplace set (R. 1643, 1650511.

4
Fire investigators who were on the scene shortly after the fire
•as extinguished were also unable to locate any silver items or
silverware (R. 379, 422, 597, 776-77, 1036-38). One fireman
testified that some utensils were found, but they appeared to be
silver plate or stainless steel (R. 399-400, 417).
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James Ashby, an investigator with the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office at the time of defendants' fire, visited the
three ZCMI stores in the Salt Lake City area and examined their
sales records for any record of silverware purchases made by
defendants.

After searching through "thousands" of records, he

could find no evidence of such purchases {R. 1588-92).

Also,

several witnesses from various furniture and appliance stores in
the Salt Lake City area testified that they were unable to find
any records of purchases by defendants of several major items
defendants claimed in their proof-of-loss statement {R. 1544-85,
1594-1621).
At trial, defendants presented a number of witnesses.
Four expert witnesses gave testimony intended to rebut the State's
evidence that the light bulb object found in Kimberly's bedroom
was a device designed to start a fire and that a flammable
liquid--acetone--which had been poured on the floor of defendants'
house prior to the fire had contributed to the explosion and fire
{R. 1725-43, 1747-1804, 1816-38, 2115-37).

Seven witnesses were

called who generally testified as to their knowledge of the
contents of defendants' home prior to the fire (R. 1839-1973,
1980-2049).
Mrs. Nickles also took the stand at trial.

She

generally testified that prior to the fire defendants were not
experiencing financial difficulties <R. 2185-86), that she was
shocked to hear about the fire {R. 2187), that defendants did not
have large quantities of acetone in their house <R. 2198), that
although she believed the fire was started intentionally, neither
-14-

she nor Mr. Nickles nor her daughters started the fire (R. 2187,
1 266),
0

and finally, that she was under a great deal of pressure to

,-,mplete the proof-of-loss statement required by the insurance

company as part of defendants' claim (R. 2077-80).

She admitted

that she told the real estate agent that a key to defendants'

home

was not available because of an alarm system, even though such a
si'stem had not actually been installed (R. 2063-64).

She also

acknowledged that there was "probably a half barrel or so of"
acetone at defendants' boat business (R. 2215).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The State presented sufficient evidence at trial from
~hich

the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that an arson

~curred

at defendants' residence, that defendants were

responsible for the arson, and that defendants committed insurance
fraud.
Because there was sufficient circumstantial evidence
from which the jury could conclude that a telephone call received
ey Eileen Rice was placed by Richard Nickles, the trial court
~operly

admitted the contents of that telephone conversation into

evidence.
Because the tiral court did not commit error with
respect to the admission of certain testimony and the asking of
certain questions by the prosecutor, or, at most, committed
harmless error in that regard, defendants are not entitled to a
ne~

trial based upon the individual or cumulative effect of

•oous evidentiary errors they allege occurred.
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The trial court did not err in refusing to give
defendants' requested jury instruction concerning estimates and
the offense of insurance fraud.

The substance of defendants'

instruction was given in one of the court's jury instructions.
Although there was an appearance of a conflict of
interest on the part of the prosecutor who prosecuted defendants'
case, defendants are not entitled to a new trial.

They fail to

show any actual prejudice, the standard that must be met given the
context in which the conflict of interest issue was raised.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT
TRIAL TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT.
Defendants argue that the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury's verdict.
Specifically, they contend that the evidence was insufficient to
support any one of three findings that the jury necessarily made:
Cl) that an arson occurred, (2) that defendants were responsible
for the arson, if there actually was an arson, and (3) that
defendants committed insurance fraud.

Each of these points will

be dealt with separately.
A.
Under UTAH CODE ANN.

§

76-6-103 Cl978), the statute the

jury found defendants had violated, "!al person is guilty of
aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he
intentionally and unlawfully damages
structure(.]"

a habitable

Defendants first argue that there was insufficient

evidence to prove that an arson occurred at their home.
-16-

However,

in

arguing this point, defendants ignore several well established

eunciples of appellate review regarding sufficiency of evidence
,

111

est ions.

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting a conviction, this Court has applied the
following standard of review:
This Court will not lightly overturn the
findings of a jury. We must view the
evidence properly presented at trial in
the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, and will only interfere when the
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial
that a reasonable man could not possibly
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt. We also view in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict those
facts which can be reasonably inferred
from the evidence presented to it.
State y. Mccardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982)
omitted).

(citations

And, the trier of fact is not obligated to believe the

evidence most favorable to the defendant rather than that
presented in opposition by the State.

State y. Howell, 649 P.2d

91, 97 (Utah 1982).

As noted in this brief's statement of facts,
substantial evidence was presented by the State from which the
Jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that an
arson had occurred.

Fire investigators testified that they

observed evidence of a flammable liquid explosion, multiple
points of fire origin, pour patterns and puddle areas indicative
of flammable liquids having been poured on the floor of the house
prior to the fire, and a light bulb object on the floor in a
downstairs bedrocsn experts later identified as a device commonly
' 5ed

by arsonists.

Fire investigators and explosive experts

cest1fied that the explosion was not consistent with a natural
1as explosion and likely was not caused by swamp gas.
-17-

Defendants ignore substantial, credible evidence
presented by the State, which contradicted evidence they
presented at trial, and ask the Court to view the evidence in a
light most favorable to a conclusion contrary to the jury's
verdict.

Moreover, they note testimony given by their expert

witnesses at trial without even acknowledging that directly
contradictory testimony on many of the questions was given by the
State's expert witnesses.

For example, defendants contend that

there was no evidence that the light bulb object found in
Kimberly's bedroom was set up as a device to start a fire.
Appellants' Brief at 18.

However, the State presented evidence

that the object was found in a severely burned area with
flammable liquid •trailers" leading away from the area and that
the light bulb portion was embedded in ash which suggested that
the bulb had been wrapped in paper similar to newspaper.
Defendants' contention that 450 to 2,250 gallons of
acetone would have been necessary to cause the explosion that
occurred in defendants' home, Appellants' Brief at 19, similarly
ignores contradictory evidence presented by the State.

The

testimony of Steve Roberts, an ATF chemist, that a minimum of
several gallons of flammable liquid would be necessary to cause
an explosion in a house suggested that the 450 to 2,250 gallon
estimate made by a defense witness was much too high CR. 1189).
In sum, defendants' sweeping statement that "it is clear that
!the explosion and fire) was not caused as the State theorized,"
and that •the defense experts' testimony was unrebutted,"
Appellant's Brief at 19, simply is not accurate.
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B.
Second, defendants argue that even if there was
0

ufficient evidence to show that an arson occurred, the State
insufficient evidence to prove that defendants

~esented

committed the arson.
well-settled rules:

In making this claim, defendants ignore two
(1)

that circumstantial evidence alone may be

rornpetent to establish the guilt of the accused, State y,
646 P.2d 723, 725 !Utah 1982), and !2) that this Court

~·

will view in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict those
facts that can be reasonably inferred from the evidence presented
Le

it.

fil.;lte y, Mccardell, 652 P.2d at 945.
The information filed against defendants charged that

they "by means of fire and/or explosion intentionally and

unlawfdly damaged a habitable strLJcture, or that acting with the
required mental state for the commission of [aggravated arson]
die solicit,

request, comrr.and, encourage, or intentionally aid

ar:c•ther person to engage in conduct to damage said habitable
structLJre . . • • " ("Information" (R. 19)
CTl,H CCDE

Nm.

§

76-2-202 (1978).

(Appendix All.

~

Thus, the jury could have

found deferic'C<Tts guilty of aggrave.tec' c-.rsor> if it concluded that
they either directly committed the offense or aided its

conr:-.ission.

£.e.e Instructions Nos. 15 and 16 (R. 79-80)

!Appendix

The jury had before it considerable circumstantial evidence,

Bl·

outlined in this brief' s statement of facts, frorr. which it cotild
have

reasonably concluded that defendants were responsible for

'l:e arson,
~r

either on a theory of direct commission of the offense

a theory of aiding the commission of the offense.
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This case

is not like

~y.

Linden, 666 P.2d 875 (Utah 1983), where Ui:

Court held that sufficient evidence was not ad0uceo at trial to
tie the defendant to the arson.
From the State's evidence, which, as with many arsor1
cases, was nearly all circumstrr1tial, the jury could have
reasonably inferred the following facts.

Defendants were

experiencing serious financial problems and planned to burn down
their house to alleviate those problems.

Mrs. Nickles declineC:

to give the real estate people a key to the house and lied to
them about a burglar alarm system because she did not war1t ther
to have access to the house while rrq.<1ratic•ns fer the fire wer<
beins made.

For the same reason, she did not give a key tc th·

neighbor boy who was to care fer the cat.

Mrs. Nickles traveled

to California with her two darshters and the farnily' s dogs two
days prior to the fire in croer to set up an alibi for herself.
On the evening prior to Mr. Nickles's departure for California,
he put the casserole outside the front door for the neighbor boy
to pick up because he did not wish to have the boy come inside
the house.

Nearly all the lights were on in defendants' house at

approximately 3:00 a.m. the morning Mr. Nickles left for
California because he was preparing for the fire.

Acetone, large

quantities of which Mrs. Nickles told a neighbor defendants had
access to and which was found in heavy concentrations in the
linings of suitcases discovered in defendants' house after the
fire, was poured by Mr. Nickles around the

l•CL'SE

to accelerate

the fire once it was started by the light bulb device located
Kimberly's bedroom.

Mr. Nickles left for California

-20-

in

~pproximately

thirteen hours prior to the fire in order to set up

'"alibi for himself.

Defendants did not rush back from

after being informed about the fire because they were

~11fornia

"ol suq'rised by its occurrence.

c.
Finally, defendants argue that the State's evidence was
,0

sufficient to support their convictions of insurance fraud.

They were charged under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-521

(1978)

with

Etther directly committing insurance fraud or aiding its
cc~~

18

issior. ("Information" (R. 19) (Appendix Al; Instructior. No.
(AFpendix Bl l.

82)

(R.

Section 76-6-521 provides:

Every person who presents, or causes to
be presented, any false or fraudulent
claim, or any proof in s~pport of any
such claim, upon any contract of
insurance for the payment of any loss,
or who prepares, makes or s~bscribes
any account, certificate of survey,
affidavit or proof of loss, or other
book, paper or writing, with intent to
present or use the same, or to allow
it to be presented or used, in support
of any such claim is punishable as in
the manner prescribed for theft of
property of like value.
In closing argument at trial, the State focused on
fever al

i terns regarding the charge of

~efendants'

~a~s

ir,surc>.nc~

fraud, including

claim for $12,258 in sterling silverw;;;re and the

defendants submitted for reconstruction of their house (R.
In reviewing the evidence concerning those two itens

2351-53).

'lone, it canrot be said that a reasonable person could not
~sFibly

'.lated

have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants had
§

76-6-521.

During a thcrough search of the debris

·''<.r the fire, investigators and firemen were unable to find any
-21-

sterling silverware of the type claimed by defendants.

The store

from which the Eilverware had allegedly been purchased had no
records of sales of silverware to defendants.

Defendants

n~v~r

showed any of the reE'aining six place settings of silverware tt.c·
allegedly recovered after the fire from a floor vault in the
house.

The plans defendants subr.iitted to the insurcince cor.1pany

for reconstruction of their house included three items--an
intercom system, a telephone switch syster,1, and a burglar alam
system Call items Mr. Nickles told the person wto prepared the
blueprints were in the house prior to the firel--which, the
evidence showed, were not in the house prior to the fire.
Nickles herself testified that the

hou~e

Mrs.

did not have a burglar

alarm system or an intercom systerr. CR. 2064, 2261).
In sum, under the standards for review of an
insufficiency of evidence claim set forth by this Court, the
State presented sufficient evidence to support defendants'
convictions of aggravated arson and insurance fraud.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
OF A TELEPHONE CALL RECEIVED BY EILEEN RICE
FROM A PERSON WfiO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS
DICK NICKLES, THE DEFENDANT.
Defendants argue that the trial court erroneously
admitted evidence of a telephone call received by Eileen Rice, a
secretary for ATF, from a person who identified himself as Dick
Nickles, the defendant.

Ms. Rice testified that on November lD,

1980, she received a call from a person who identified himself a'

Dick Nickles CR. 14921.

Ms. Rice related the following about the

telephone conversation:
-22-

He was askins about some articles that
had been remove6 fror his hon.e and then
mentioned to me that there had been a
suspected arson at his horr.e <r.c:i that he had
been suspect lsicl of it and commented that
wasn't it lucky he had been 800 r' iles away
with the Secretary of the Department of
Energy and that he would have needed a very
long fuse or a time delay.
Then, he again came back to the fact
that these articles were missing and I asked
what was missing and he said some silverware
and other things, whole drawers full. And I
told him I didn't believe we had them and
that he said possibly they hac been removed
for safekeeping.
I told him that I didn't think we had
them, but that I would have John Minichino
call when he got back to the office.
'R,

1493-94).

o~ection

The court adr,,itted this evidence over defendants'

that the identity of the caller had not been

sufficiently established.

Ms. Rice

acln~ttec

on cross-exarr.ination

tr,at she had never met Mr. Nickles and probably had not heard his
"01ce before the telephone call CR. 1495).
The general rule in this country is that the identity
·fa

telephcr.e c<>ller may be established by circumstantial

f1;ou.ce.

(Wash. App. 1984); State v.

i60, 261
i4, 605

State y. Panielson, 37 Wash. App. 469, 471, 681 P.2d

P.2d 1121, 1128 (1980),

·9 A.L.R.

3d 79 (1977).

J:l~i.lilIJ,

~ ~.

As noted in State

185 Mont. 522, 533-

447 U.S. 924; Annot.,

v._~:

Where the recipient of a call is not
familiar with the cc:ller' s voice, "!cl orroboration of a statement of identity by
the caller sufficient to render the
conversation admissible against him may
be supplied by evidence (1) that the
subject matter of the call revealed that
only the named party would likely have
knowledge of those conversational facts
f; olr (2) of other confirr;-,ing circumstances which make it probable that the
named per~on was, in fact, the speaker."
-23-

!Ci ta ti ons omitted. l State v. Marlar
<1972), 94 Idaho 803, 498 P.2d 1276, 1281.
605 P.2d at 1128.

"In order to adequately identify the party

against whom the evidence is sought to be introduced, the
circumstance, even though slight, must at leaEt tend to
the party as the caller.•
P.2d 1276, 1281 (1972).

ide~tify

State v • .ilQ.Il.£..r, 94 Idaho 803, 808, 498
And, if sufficient proof is ir,troduced tG

permit a reasonable trier of fact to fincl in favor of
identification, the identification requirement is rret.
Danielrnn, 681 P.2d at 261.
90l(bl

(6)

(Supp. 1984).

~~Utah

State: v.

R. Evici. 90l(b)

(~)

and

During the telephone conversation with

Ms. Fice, tt.e caller disclcsed knowleGge of several facts that
likely would be known only to RicharG Nickles, er someone in hiE
family--e.g., that he was 800 rriles awey froro Salt Lake City
meeting with the Secretary of the Department of Energy c.nc th2t
some silverware ar'Forently was missing.

Under the standards set

forth above, this was sufficient proof of identification.

The

trial court therefore properly admitted Ms. Rice's testimony
concerning the telephone conversation.
POUJT III
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW
TRIAL BASED UPON THE INDIVIDUAL AND
CUMULl'.TIVE EFFECT OF ALLE'GEDLY It:FkOHR
ADMISSION OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to a new trial
because the trial court, on numerous occasions, erroneously
admitted evidence.

These errors, they contend, require reversal

due to both their individual and cumulative effect.

Defendant~

have identified eight evidentiary categories under which the
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1 1Jeged

errors are grouped.

Each of these categories will be

addressed separately.

A.
Defendants first contend that the trial court erred in
,])owing irrelevant testimony over their objections.

Although

:c,st of the identified instances of alleged error are reviewable,

,,frr.dants appear to have waived any error regarding admission of
testimony concerning flammable liquids other than acetone and
insurance coverage for the rebuildir.g of a garage {R. 870, 1312)

.s

fr,is is so because they failed to make o timely objection to that
t2~tir.ony

at trial.

!l'tah 1982)
;~d

~

.fil.2,te y. Mccardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947

(the contemporaneocs cl:,jection rule rec:uires timely

specific objection to the admission of evidence in order for

tr.e question of admissibility to be considered on appeal).

Defense counsel's objection to the testimony referred to above wao
1

:,ot made until after the witness's answer was already in {R. 870,

In general, counsel is not allowed to gamble upon the

1:!2l.

~cssibili

a~ission
0Horrnt.

ty of a favorable answer, but must object to the
of evidence as soon as the ground for objection becomes
CLEARY, McCORtHCK ON EVIDENCE § 52, at 126

'Whrn [defense counsel]
o'.ilch

<1984).

has been made fully aware of the response

a question is bound to elicit, he should Object When the

;~est1on

is asked,

rather than delay with the hope of inviting

error and laying the foundation for a mistrial.•

United States v..

3

Defendants cite T. 1101 {R. 1321) as a point in the transcript
~here inadmissible testimony of flammable liquids other than

cetone was received.
However, the flammable liquid mentionec by
:he witness was not identified.

0
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Armedo-Satmiento, 545 F.2d 785, 795 (2d Cir. 1976),

~.

~.

430 U.S. 917 (1977).
As for the testimony concerning lights that were on in
nearly every room of defendants' house at 3:00 a.m. on the mornin'j
of Mr. Nickles's departure for California, the casserole picked up
from defendants' house by a neighbor boy, and estimates for
rebuilding

defendan~s'

home in Arizona, defendants' claim that

admission of that allegedly irrelevant evidence Cto which they
made timely objection at trial) requires reversal, is without
merit.

That evidence was relevant to proving material facts

underlying the alleged arson--i.e., motive and opportunity--and
thus was admissible under Utah R. Evid. 1(2)

Cl977J which defines

"relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove the existence of any material fact.•
Utah R. Evid. 402 (Supp. 1984) (the current rule).

.s..e_e .al..s.Q

Moreover, the

trial court is given broad discretion in conducting a trial,
particularly in the matter of receiving evidence.
Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 1977).

State

y.

In determining whether

evidence is relevant, the trial court should be accorded a large
measure of discretion and should be reversed only if it abuses
that discretion.
1977).

~

Martin v. Safeway, 565 P.2d 1139, 1141 <Utah

A review of the evidence referred to above reveals no such

abuse.
Finally, although there may be some question as to the
relevance of the testimony about the proximity of Mr. Nickles's
business to Deseret Industries, any error in the admission of that
evidence was harmless.

There simply is no reasonable likelihood
-26-

that withcut the error there would have been a differer:t result in

orfendants' trial.
!982); Utah R.
R, Ev

State y.

Evid. 4 <1977)

id. 103 (al

Hut~,

655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah

(the current comparable rule is Utah

(Supp. 1984) l; UTAH CODE ANN.

§

77-35-30 (a)

i 198:0) •

B.
Defendants claim that inadmissible hearsay evidence was
irproperly admitted at trial when Jerry Taylor, an ATF expert on
explosives, was allowed to testify about hEcarsay which provideC:
the basis for his expert testimony.

Specifically, they point to

Taylor's te< tir.;or.::,1 regarding inforr.1ation on the circUI!'stances of
t~e

fire thc:t one of the investigators of defendants' fire

f'rovided him

(R.

1282).

However, this claim ignores the purpose

for which the information from the investigator was offered.

It

'as not offered fer the truth of the information provided, but as
i~form2tion

~earsay

relied upon by Taylor in givins expert testimony.

testimony was necessary to establish a foundation for

Taylor's expert opinion and thus was properly admitted.
~.

The

State y.

Utah, _ _ P.2d _ _ , No. 18998, slip op. at 16 <filed

December 31, 1984).

As noted by the Court

in~'

"an expert

':tness in a civil or criminal case may rely on hearsay matter if
it is

the kind of information that experts in the subject matter

•ould regularly rely upon."

~.

slir, op. at 16 n. 16, .tilin.g

fu.li y. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 725-26 (Utah 1982).
Stgni f icantly, defendants do not argue that the inf orma ti on from
:r,~

investigator is not the kind of informe<tion regularly relied

'eon by expE-rts such as Taylor.
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c.
A prerequisite to the admission of a witness's
testimony is that the witness have personal knowledge of the
matter as to which he or she is going to testify.

Utah R. Evid.

29 !197711 Utah R. Evid. 602 (Supp. 19841; State v. Jones, 656
P.2d 1012, 1014 (Utah 19821.

Defendants contend that Mark Brown,

vice-president of the corporation that runs Carriage House, was
allowed to testify about store sales records although he had no
personal knowlege of the contents of those records

(R.

1594-1616).

The trial transcript appears to support this claim

(R.

16091.

However, defendants are not in a position to argue that the trial
court erred in this regard.

Al though they moved to strike Mr.

"'

Brown's testimony when it became apparent that he lacked the

fl

necessary personal knowledge to testify about the sales records,

~:1

they failed to request a ruling on their motion after the trial

,,

judge indicated that he was taking the motion under advisement (R.
1610, 16141.

Under these circumstances, the Court should not

consider defendants' assignment of error.
D.

Defendants argue that the trial court committed
prejudicial error when, in six separate instances, it overruled
defendants' objections to questions that allegedly assumed facts
not in evidence.

Although it is generally accepted that a

question is objectionable if it assumes facts not in evidence,
~State

y. Weese, 424 A.2d 705, 709 n. 4, (Me. 198111 State v.

hn.e..J::, 273 S.C. 646, 654-55, 258 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1979), a review
of the questions defendants challenge reveals no clear
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nJation of this general rule, at least as to most of the
r-Jlenged questions.
,ccr' objectionable,

And, even for those questions th<lt rr_ay have

if the trial court's refusal to sustain

idendants' objections to them was error, it was at most harmless
It was harmless because there is no reasonable likelihood

e''or.

•r, 0 t in U'E absence of the error there would have been a different

,,_,ult in defendants' trial.
Ii\11

CODE AFt:.

§

77-35-30 (a)

State y. Hutchison, 655 P.2d at 636;
(1982).

The prosecutor's questions to Ms. Rice

regar~ing

a

'.oiq:.hone convcrsution she had 1<;itt: a r,erscn who ic<cl'tified
'_rsElf as Dick Nickles were phrased in such a way as not to
that Mr. Nickles was uncontrovertedly the caller.

"'sune

The

;rosecutor used the phrase "the person purporting to be Mr.
::ickles" when asking his questions, after the trial court
:,:tainEd an objectior. to the forn, of cr.e question wr.ich assumed
-.'.ct tUre was r.o doubt that Mr. Nickles was the caller (R. 1492-

Thus, defendants assignment of error in this regard lacks

;;1,

Defendants' contention that the prosecutor's question
·r

~:ark

Brown, an e111ployee of Carriage House, concernins

"''cr.dants' possible purchase of a dresser from Carriage House
0' 0 wred

facts r.ct in evidence (R. 1603), similarly is without

rci1t.

As noted by the trial judge in ruling upon the propriety

:'.the question, Mr. Nelson, the atto;::ney who took stater-1ents frorr,
·-:enJantc; for the insurance company, had previocsly testified
"' the ~-roof-of-loss statement submitted by defendants listed

iture items purchased from Carriage House
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(R.

1402, 1602).

Nor was there any error regarding the prosecutor's
question to a witness who had hung draperies for defendants about
whether the draperies could be used in another house

(R.

1956).

Defendants claim the question impermissibly assumed that
defendants intended to take the draperies to a new house.
Although the question is arguably only marginally acceptable, it
appears to have been proper in that evidence of defendants' desire
to move to Phoenix had previously been introduced (R. 1912).
Defendants have not shown that it was improper to allow
the prosecutor to ask one witness about whether trailers used to
relocate Mr. Nickles's mother were listed in defendants' proof-ofloss statement.

There was a dispute at trial when the question

was asked as to whether the statement actually listed the trailers
(R. 1997-98).

The statement was not made a part of the record on

appeal, and therefore defendants' assertion that they are unable
to find any such entry on the statement cannot be verified.

Under

these circumstances, this Court cannot rule on whether the
prosecutor's question assumed facts not in evidence.
Wylffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 292-93 (Utah 1982),

State y,

~ ~.

460

U.S. 1044 (1983).
Admittedly, two of the prosecutor's questions present
some difficulties.

His question to Lynette Daniels about whether

defendants had ever spilled a large quantity of acetone in their
suitcases and his question about "backup" devices used to cause a
fire, in the context in which they were asked, were probably at
best marginally acceptable.

However, as noted above, any error in

allowing those questions to be asked was harmless.
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E.
Defendants note three points during their trial where
-e 0 timony

allegedly beyond an expert witness's expertise was

etconeously admitted.
~een

They claim that Olin Yearby should not have

allowed to testify about sources of ignition, that Aaron

Nelson's testimony regarding insurance coverage was improper, and
that Iraj Aalam should not have been forced to answer a question
on

feel-air explosions.

Each of these claims is without merit.

At page 1609 (R. 1837) of the trial transcript, where
defendants claim Mr. Aalam was forced to answer a question on
fuel-air explosions, no such answer appears.
answer was ever given (R. 1837-38).

In fact, no such

The prosecutor withdrew his

;Jestion after the court sustained an objection to the form of the
question (R. 1838).
As for the challenged testimony of Mr. Yearby, the
trial court could have reasonably concluded that the testimony was

within the scope of the witness's expertise, who testified that he
~a]

received arson investigation training from the National Fire

~cademy

that

in Emmitsburg, Maryland (R. 578-79).

I t is well settled

the suitability of expert testimony in a particular case and

•ne qualification of the proposed expert are within the sound
discretion of the trial court.
'ib

lUtah 1982).

State y. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723,

As noted in Clayton:

In State y. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d
865 (1959), this Court held that where i t
appeared to the trial court that there was
a reasonable foundation for the opinion
of the expert witness, it was within the
discretion of the court to admit the
opinion and allow any frailties therein
to be exposed on cross-examination.
-31-

"The faults in it .
. go to its ~eight
r a the r th a r to i t s core, le>e t ency . "
10 Utah 2d at 38, 347 P.2d at 868.
646 P. 2d at 726.

Finally, the trial court could bave reasonably
determined that

~r.

Kelson was qualified to tlstify about "loE:

use" provisions ir, insurance policie2.

,

Mr. NelH•r• test if iec the.

he had experience as an attorney in litigatir.g these tyi:-es of
provisions

(R. 1386).

Thus,

under the Clarton standaro,

the re

appears to have been no atuse of discrt:ctior. by the court ir,
allowing Mr. Nelson to give the testimony challer.ged by
defendants.

F.
Defendants contend that the trial court erroneously
allowed several witnesses to answer questior.s f:-<:s<=d by the
proseCL:t or tr.cit c21led for a speculative respor.se.

It is cleeir

that que.ctions callins for a purely speculative response fror, a
witness are improper.

~~-1:·L::.ll,

<Ala. Cr. App. 1979).

Although the tricl court apt,ears to hcvc

erred in this regard, a re\iew cf the

370 So.2d J C7C, 1074

irnpro1~r

questions

ideritified by defendants indicates that the errors were harr,less.
State v. Hutchison, 655 P.26 at 636; UTAH CODE r.n;. § 77-35-JOlal
<1982).

G.
Defendants argue that the trial court should have
granted their motion to strike an unresponsive answer given t•y c•,
of the State's expert witnesses.

Generally,

it is not per sc

error to admit into evidence testimony that may be unresponsive,
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it

le

rflevc.T1t for

sorr,e puq::ose .

.£e.9.1-l~Y~-lla~,

, 184-85, 517 P. 2d 461, 465 ( 1973).
i:r ' " f·C·r•sive answer,

183 Colo.

When objection is made to

the triill cc,urt may perr1t the testir7.ony

""nd or may grant a motion to strike,

the deterr;iinat1ve test

ti1e- mntior. to strike being whether the ar1swcr would unduly
'"Ju!Cice one of the rarties.
,:. 1979).

Rice

v.

l'.i~.f',

603 P.2d 1125, 1130

Although the ans1-•er given by the State's witness

·rttedly was unresic·nEive, defendants f«il to sho"'' that the
,u w2' CC!7Fletely irrelevant or tr,<l it weo

unduly prejuC:icial

tr, err.•
H.

DefePdants identify four "argumentative" qLestions they
.ege the trial court ir,1prq.-erly allowed the rrosecutor to ask.

·,,.·,er, only three of those questions are subject to review.
,f,:r.dcnts have providec no record citation for the qucst1or:
:.q crteC:ly asked of one witness concerning a motion to compel
c,\cry by dEfendants.

Thus,

the Court hoE no means of

L.1e1<1inc; that assignment of error.

~State

y•

.l'J.l.ci<.f'.r, 657 P.2d

ilt2h 1982).
As for the other questions,
·.·!of prejudicial error.

nenE aFpears to rise to the

It is r.ot at all clear that the

·t1or: ccncerning a fuel explosion posed to a defense "''itness
had expertise in "air exchange" was asked "sim1:ly to imply

·.: the witness had no expertise,• as defendants allege.
·<'llants' Brief at 48.

Such a conclusion is not warranted based

the context in which the que[tion

w~E

asked.

Furthermore,

Urat the question was never answerec due to another
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objection by defendants which was sustained, the witness nevE.r
exposed any lack of expertise in the c.rea.

l'riC,

the jury wc:s r«•t

likely to infer that from the question alone (R. 1837-38)
(Appendix Cl •
The question to an insurance adjuster about whether
defendants had ever been told that they could clc:im i terns on their
proof-of-loss statement that were not in their house <lt th<- tir.'(
of the fire appears to have been proper sir.CE evicJence had beu,
presented that numerous items listed on that statement had not
been recovered in the remains of the fire (R. 1513, 1622-24,
1647).
Finally, although allowing the prosecutor to ask
Kimberly Nickles whether she hacJ Llirown her pom-Foms over the
neighbors' fence was probably improper, the question was
relatively insignificant and likely had little effect on the
jury's decision.
Based upon the foregoing discussion of defendants'
allegations of error, reversal of their convictions is not
warranted on the basis of any individual error or on a theory of
cumulative error.

Because the trial court

ccn~ittee

no errors or,

at most, committed harmless error, defendants' convictions should
be affirmed.

£e..e Bc:wku. v. Hcl..f', 644 P.2d 111, ll3 (Okl. Cr.

1982) (holding that where there is no individual error, there can
be no error by accumulation); St9te y. l"cFenzie, 608 P.2d 428,
(Mont. 1980),

~•

.de.n..i.e.J:1, 449 U.S. 1050; United States

581 F.2d 1294, 1304 (8th Cir. 1978),
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~.

~.

y.

448

Botr,

439 U.S. 958.

POrnT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GIVE DEFENDl.l\TS' REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCT ION CONCERN ING EST HlATES AND
THE OFFENSE OF Il\SURANCE FRAUD.

Defendants cortend that lhE trial court erroneously
refused to give paragraph 5 of Defendants' Requested Instruction
':,,. 14 (R. 122)

(f<prendix Dl.

Al though the court instructed the

;cry on the definition of "estimate" (Instruction No. 19, R. 83,
;:rfrdi:; Fl, defendants argue that its refusal to include in the
.r.'truction defining insurance fraud that one of the ele!i\ents of
the offense was that defencia1,ts' "subr:-.issior.s [to the insurance
:ompany J were more than 'estimates' , " may have confused the jury
:c

~uch

a dee;ree that a guilty verdict was reached without

'dficient evidence of criminal conduct.

Apparently, defendants

telieve that under the instructions given the jury may have
ccrvicted defendants even though they had concluded that the
!

;a\ues for the i terns def enoant s included in their pr oaf-of-loss
:t:tei:ient were legitimate estimates of those values.
However, the court's Instructior: No. 21 adequately
aucressed defendants' concern.

It read:

You are instructed that an act cor.n.1itted or
an omissior. made under ignorance or mistake
of fact which disproves any criminal intent
is net a crime. Thus a person is not guilty
of a crime if he acts under an honest and
reasonable belief in the existence of certain
facts and circumstanceE l"hich, if true, would
make such an act or omission lawful.
If you
find that the defendants, or either one,
because of a reasonable mistake, made certain
claims upon an insurance company believing
such claims to be true to the best of his
knowledse, then you must fine him pot guilty
of insurance fraud.
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(R. 85).

Given the content of that instruction, defendants were

not prejudiced by the court's refusal to give paragraph 5 of their
requested instruction.

The substance of defendants' requested

instruction was contained in Instruction No. 21.
POINT V
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW
TRIAL BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE CONFLICT
OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF THE DEPUTY
COUNTY ATTORNEY WHO PROSECUTED THEIR CASE.
As noted by defendants, on June 12, 1983, this Court,
pursuant to stipulation of the parties, remanded defendants' case
to the trial court for a supplemental proceeding on the issue of
prosecutorial misconduct CR. 166).

At a hearing held on April l

and 7, 1983, in the trial court before Judge James S. Sawaya, who
did not preside over defendants' trial, the following facts were
established.
Michael Christensen, who prosecuted the State's case
against defendants, had been employed by the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office since 1976 CR. 2426, 2437).

He began handling

arson and insurance fraud investigations and prosecutions for that
office in February 1979, prosecting approximately nine arson cases
over a four year period (R. 2437).

He had received formalized

training in arson and insurance fraud investigation from the
National Fire Academy and taught classes in arson for profit for
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ( "ATF")

<R.

2 43 8) .

In June or July of 1980, the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office received a federal grant to establish a county-wide arson task force ("task force")

(R. 2439).

became the lead prosecutor for the task force.
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Mr. Christensen
His

responsibilities ranged from investigation at the fire scene, to
,ssuance of subpoenas, to screening of cases for prosecution (R.
The entire task force investigated the fire that

;141-42).

occurred at defendants' home on October 30, 1980 (R. 2450).

Mr.

Christensen, along with other task force personnel, reviewed the
:ase for possible criminal charges (R. 2452).

An information

:narging defendants with aggravated arson and insurance fraud was
::Jed on June 30, 1981 (R. 19, 2452, 247 9).
In late March 1981, Mr. Christensen, his wife, and Jim
Ashby formed a private corporation called Arson and Fraud

Investigations,

Inc.

("AFI")

CR. 2456-57).

The corporation was

designed primarily to provide jobs in arson investigation for
several employees of the county attorney's arson task force who
:.ad been advised that their jobs would terminate on June 1, 1981
R. 2460).

:rigin.

AF! investigated fire scenes to determine cause and

It performed approximately eight investigations in Idaho,

•yoming, and Utah, generally for insurance companies or insurance
;d'usters CR. 2468-72, 2492).

Mr. Christensen personally

participated in a number of these investigations (R. 2465-73).
Although Mr. Christensen did not tell Ted Cannon, the
3alt Lake County Attorney, about AF! when it incorporated, he
1

;~ormed Mr. Cannon of AFI and its activities after the latter

>nquired about the matter in May 1981 CR. 2473).

John T. Nielsen,

'.hief Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, testified that it was his
Jnderstanding that Mr. Cannon asked Mr. Christensen to
:!sassociate himself from AF! in June 1981 (R. 2488, 2491-92).
'fi

ceased doing business in September 1981; however, Mr.
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Christensen did testify in a Boise, Idaho criminal case pursuant
to subpoena in February 1982 about an investigation conducted bj
AF! prior to September 1981 (R. 2486-87).

A.FI filed articles of

dissolution on December 8, 1982 CR. 2488).
According to Mr. Christensen, most of AFI's
investigations were conducted in Idaho and Wyoming to avoid the
potential conflicts of having investigators testify in Salt Lake
City area arson cases CR. 2481).

All of the work Mr. Christensen

performed on defendants' case between October 1980 and June 1981
was performed in his capacity as a deputy county attorney <R.
2482-83).

During his investigation of this case, Mr. Christensen

never concealed any evidence or advised anyone connected with the
case to conceal evidence (R. 2484).
At the close of the hearing, defendants moved for a new
trial on the grounds that they were deprived of due process and
equal protection of the laws due to the appearance of or actual
existence of a conflict of interest on the part of Mr. Christensen
because of his involvement with A.FI CR. 168-72, 176-77, 2525-32).
Although the trial court's decision on that motion is not in the
record on appeal, the court apparently denied the motion.
According to defendants, the court did so because the motion was
untimely and for the further reason that it was meritless.
Appellant's Brief at 26.

For purposes of responding to

defendants' argument on appeal, the State will assume that
defendants have accurately stated the basis upon which the courL
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denied their motion. 6
Because the State stipulated to the supplemental
,roceeding conducted before Judge Sawaya, it would not be
:ons1stent now to argue that defendants' motion for a new trial,
,~ 1 ich

arguably was necessary to preserve the conflict of interest

·ssue for appeal, was untimely and therefore that issue should not
,,~considered

by the Court.

The State will address the merits of

;dendants' motion.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-1.2 (2d ed.
:9801 states that "[al

prosecutor should avoid the appearance or

reality of a conflict of interest with respect to official
i,ties.• 7

UTAH CODE ANN.

§

67-16-4(4) (1978) provides that "[nlo

p1bl1c officer or public employee shall • • • [alccept other
err.ployrnent which he might expect would impair his independence of
1dgment in the performance of his public duties."

Under these

r<les, a deputy county attorney who is involved with a private
6 The State,

subsequent to the filing of this brief, will file a
motion to supplement the record with the trial court's decision
on defendants' motion for a new trial.
The commentary adds:
Standard 3-2.3(b) recommends that the offices for chief
prosecutor and staff be full-time occupations. The commentary to
that standard points out that a conflict of interest may arise
from part-time devotion to the duties of public prosecutor. The
.nstant standard complements this provision.
When the possibility of a conflict of interest arises, the
~DHcutor should recuse himself or herself and make appropriate
arrangements for the handling of the particular matter by other
counsel in accordance with the principles contained in this
rc 0 pter. • It is of the utmost importance that the prosecutor
dio1a participation in a case in circumstances where any
lmplica ti on of par ti al i ty may cast a shadow over the integrity of
'.~e off ice.
*See standard 3-2.10.
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corporation that investigates possible arson and insurance fraud
cases for insurance companies should not also be representing thP
state in the prosecution of those types of cases, even though the
private investigations are conducted outside of the county in
which he is a prosecutor.
a conflict of interest.

This is so because of the appearance of
As observed in People y. Superior Ct.

Contra Costa Cty., 19 Cal.3d 255, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d
1164 (1977):
Thus not only is a judicial requirement
of prosecutorial impartiality reconcilable
with executive discretion in criminal cases,
it is precisely because the prosecutor enjoys
such broad discretion that the public he serves
and those he accuses may justifiably demand
that he perform his functions with the
highest degree of integrity and impartiality,
and with the appearance thereof. One of the
reasons often cited for the institution of
public prosecutions is that "Americans believed
that an officer in a position of public trust
could make decisions more impartially than
could the victims of crimes or other private
complainants," persons who often brought
prosecutions under the older English system
of criminal justice.
(Miller, Prosecution
(Am. Bar Foundation 1969) p. 295; see
Meister y. People, Cl875) 31 Mich. 99,
103; 3 Holdsworth, A History of English
Law (7th ed. 1956) p. 621, 9 Holdsworth,
i.d., pp. 241, 244-45.l This advantage
of public prosecution is lost if those
exercising the discretionary duties of
the district attorney are subject to
conflicting personal interests which
might tend to compromise their
impartiality. In short, the prosecuting attorney "'is the representative
of the public in whom is lodged a
discretion which is not to be
controlled by the courts, or ~
interested individual• • • • In
(Italics added.) (United States y, Cox,
supra, 342 F.2d at p. 192.l
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of

56 1

P.2d at 1172 (footnote omitted).

The California Supreme

ourt further noted:
The preservation of prosecutorial
impartiality is perhaps most important
during the charging process, the phase
of a criminal proceeding when the
prosecutor's discretion is most apparent.
As the court in Pelli._rino noted, "the
theme which runs throughout the criminal
procedure in this state is that all
persons should be protected from having
to defend against frivolous prosecutions,
and that one major safeguard against
such prosecutions is the function of
the district attorney in screening
criminal cases prior to instituting a
prosecution."
(Fn. omitted) (27 Cal.
App.3d at pp. 205-206, 103 Cal.Rptr.
at 654.)
Surely an essential aspect
of this safeguard must be the prosecutor's
freedom from any personal or emotional
involvement in a controversy which might
bias his objective exercise of judgment.
161 P.2d at 1172 n.8.

The State must concede that, given the appearance of a
conflict of interest, Michael Christensen should not have been
the attorney assigned to investigate, file charges in, and
?rosecute defendants' case.
·~~er

However, the critical issue is

under the circumstances defendants are entitled to a new

c·1al based upon this apparent conflict of interest.
In Wri._bt y. United States, 732 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir.
1984), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently outlined a

scaled approach to the review of prosecutor ial conflict of
<nterest

claims:
We note in passing that a lesser showing
may warrant disqualification of a prosecutor
rather than dismissal of an indictment. See
generally United States y, Heldt, 668 F.2d
1238, 1274-78 CD.C.Cir.1981), ~. ~,
456 U.S. 926, 102 s.ct. 1971, 72 L.Ed.2d
-41-

440 (1982). Indeed, we think that the
degree of prosecutorial misconduct of the
sort here in question and the degree of
prejudice to the defendant necessary to
justify action by a reviewing court
steadily increase as the case goes forward,
with the least being required on a motion
to disqualify, somewhat more on a pretrial
motion to dismiss an indictment, still
more on a motion in the district court
after conviction but before appeal, somewhat more on a direct appeal, and as will
be developed below, a good deal more on
collateral attack.
732 F.2d at 1056 n.8.
(D.C. Cir. 1981),

~.

In United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238

.de.n.i.eJl, 456 U.S. 926 (1982), the court

stated:
Given the need to promote the appearance of
justice, a trial court on timely motion
should disqualify a prosecutor from
participating in a criminal action when he
has a personal conflicting interest in a
civil case. The question we face here,
however, is the very different one of what
should be done when defendants have failed to
move to disqualify on the ground of a
conflict of interest, yet assert a denial of
due process on appeal. ~ Magjuka y.
Greenberger, 46 A.D.2d 867, 362 N.Y.S.2d 162,
163 <1974). We must reconcile the
governmental interests in conserving judicial
and prosecutorial resources and in preserving
the appearance of impartiality with the
interest of the defendant in receiving fair
and evenhanded treatment from his accusers.
We believe the best resolution is to require
in such circumstances that the defendants
prove actual prejudice. .!:.f...._ United States y.
Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 559-60 (3d Cir. 1979)
(actual prejudice standard applied where
prosecutor testified before grand jury},
~. ~. 444 u.s. 1032, loo s.ct. 703,
62 L.Ed.2d 668 (1980). With regard to an
appearance of conflict on the part of the
prosecution, on appeal a defendant has cause
to complain only if he was prejudiced. ~
People y, Poplis, 30 N.Y.2d 85, 281 N.E.2d
167, 330 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1972). To the extent
he might receive relief from a prosecution
solely on a showing of potential prejudice,
-42-

he would be the undeserving beneficiary of a
rule that attempts to promote the public
good.
In our judgment the strong
governmental interest in expedient
proceedings justifies a rule that gives the
defendants on the facts of this case relief
only if they can demonstrate prejudice;
otherwise, the convictions will stand.
f,G f.2d at 1277
100 pted

in Utah.

(footnotes omitted).

This approach should be

It is consistent with other decisions from this

:oJrt that an issue that has not been properly preserved for
ifpeal in the lower court will be reviewed on appeal only when
,an 1fest injustice would occur in the absence of review.

.s.e..e_,

State y, Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81-2 (Utah 1983).

~'

Applying the above standard of review to the instant
ase, where defendants did not move to disqualify the prosecutor
·11

the ground of conflict of interest prior to or during trial,

,et assert a denial of due process and equal protection on appeal,
iefendants must show actual prejudice in order to receive a new
·11al.
i

On appeal, defendants effectively limit their argument for

new trial to the appearance of a conflict of interest on the

00rc of the prosecutor.
•d':' to know for

.s..e_e Appellants' Brief at 30 ("There is no

sure what impact the dual positions Mr.

:·.tistensen held had on his prosecutorial decisions in this
ise.").

They make no showing of actual prejudice, and, from a

.enew of the record, they appear to have suffered none.

Al though

:endants properly would have prevailed on a motion to disqualify
Christensen prior to trial based upon the appearance of a
· 'lict of interest, they are not entitled to a new trial, given
':ontext in which that issue was presented to the trial court
is now presented to this Court.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendants'
convictions and sentences should be affirmed.
RESPEC"rFULLY submitted this

;20~of

May, 1985.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

~~
-:5.~---A-~~-'
DAVE B. THOMPS-;;vt...#~-<'~
Assistant Attorney General
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Theunders1gned
John l!ngrjcbr
under oath states on information and belief that the defendants commrtted the crimes of
COL~;~

I

a second degree felonv. at 4448 Crest
OaY Drive, on or about October 31, 198"), in violatior.
of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 103, l'!:a~ Corle Annota:eC,
1953 as amended, ir, that the defcndan:s, RICH.A?~ H.ATfIEl...=i
NICKLES and HARGARE; KAY NICf'.:..Eo bv means of fire and/

AGGRA\'ATED AR.So~;,

or explosion intentionally and unlawfullv damaged a
habitable structure, or that acting with the required
mental state for the car.:w.ission of said offense did
solicit, request, command, encourage, or intentionall:»
aid another person to engage in conduct to intent10nal lv and unlawfully damage said habita~le structurP
located at 4448 Crest Oak Drive in Salt Lake Co~nt\'
State of Ctah
.

coc:n

"'
I

'

11

a second degree felony, at 4448 Crest
Oak Drive, on or between October 30, 1980 and Fe~ruar·:
10, lg Al, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Secti·:m
521, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that the
defendants, Richard Hatfield Nickles and his wife.
Margaret Kay Nickles, either as principals to said
crime or acting with the 0ental state required for the
commission of the offense of insurance fraud did directlv commit said offense, did cau:;c to be presented.
or did solicit request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid each other or anot~r person to present or
cause to be presented, any false or fraudulent clai~.
or anv proof of loss in support of any sue'!-. cl!i!J..
upon a contract of insurance with the~!tF~~s=f.. ~'r'l'I...__,
.
;-,,,,...___
Insurance Company for the payment of fire losses
purporteC]v sustained bv said defendants on a fire
that occurred on October 30, 1980 to the defendants'
residence and contents located at 4448 Crest Oak Drive --?-

INSL'RAf~CE FRAL'D,

~

) ~ ,-\
~ \,

"

'
~\~<
"'

~

)

'\..

\,

'\ \

'

(continued on Page two)
This informat1on lS based on eVl
dence obtamed from the foUowmg

wrtnes~
Olin Yearby
Jim Ashhv
Ra 1 p~. To Irr.an
John '1'in1chin0

rIL
3u

Dave Magana

Jack L1 ngr1c>--t
Jerrv Ta . ·l('r
Steve Roberts

C1rcu11 Judge

(cont' on paf-e

four)

1~

f !1 .J

J:;;

T.-.

c'C.

:,'.,-,'t·

\._._,

.l-•:,t1,\~-

1,,:.-;fIL:.'.

~;lLt·_:__[~-

1n Salt Lake (c-,',_]Jjt_V, b._•t!-', dtfer.dan:.:.s kn.~·... int sct::.~
~"1:..:--:or pu-1L'fs in sup:'ort of said c~c.:..'."'."c.5 'E·rL fa:sE- er
ra .... ,::~~c:-.:..
and that the va!ue of said fals~ or fraJdJlent cla cs
exceeded $1.0
00 in Vdlue,
1
...

PXOBABLE CAUSE STATEl".E';~
On October 31, JO
at 0121 hc•cr,
a fire alanr. was received bv Salt Lake Cc·wn~·" fire De;-'t
fr_-r a
single fa~ily dwelling loca~ed at 44~8 Crest 0d~ Drive in Sa~t
1
Lake County, State of L tah
The residence, a t'·rlck and fra::,t
split-level structure at the time of tne fire was listed on the
deed as O\.JTled by the defendant n.argaret K Nic!-des
Said
residence, at the time of the fire. was insure~ b·: Trans~ester~
Insurance, 440 South SO·J East in Salt Lah· Co·..1ntv
Co\•era.:-e
of the residence included structur·a: covera2e for fire los;
$268,00J. arpurtenant structural coverage S~b.8n.·1. pers2nd~
property luss coverage $1}".•. 0C>O. loss cf use coverat:t:' $53,t-::
and a special loss rider for furs $3, 80CI.
Tht- pc:icy n'._llT~'er
is HD-752-91-5-4
When the fire was initiallv disco':ered. it
was preceded by a severe explosion that ble~ out the ~ind0~s
and doors to the residence
Anal\'sis of ex:-ilosion debris indicated no fire or smoke dar.iagtc prier to
io;i
i..r:-.e;i tht::
fire crews responded, they cot.:lC observe a
invol'.'ed
structural fire when they cleared the station at 1 25 a m._,
and upon their arrival at 1 28 a rr., fire crews observed intense
bun1in[ in all parts of the house
The reside-nee at the ti:;ie of
the fire was W1:Jccupied, the defendants a'ld their farr.ily P'Jrportedly being in California
Affiant and Capt
Dave !'~af_a:-'.a,
both trained arson investigators. along with the Salt La~e
County Arson Strike Force, upon the cocrpletion of the fire
combat, began an ir.unediate scene search for cause and or1,?1r.
folil1d throughout the home were ''trailer'' pattens indicative of
a large quantity of flammable substance having been poured
throughout the house, substances of which were analyzed by ATF
and found to be similar to Methl-Ethvl Ketone and Acetone.
both substances that are cormoon to uSage with the fibre-glass
business
The defendant, Richard Nickles, O"!,.,"!led a hoat bus:.ness
and had been extensively involved in fibre-glass production of
boat molds
Large quantities of Acetone were foWld inside
closed sui teases positioned underneath the stairway leading to
the basement, and a plastic container with Acetone was folIDd
directly under clothing and purported furs contained in a cedar
clothes closet
Found in the basement bedroom. positioned to
the rear of the structure and not readilv obser\·a~le from the
streets next to the residence, arson inv€stigators found a;1
incendiary device described basically as a large wattage lig~t
bulb, connected to a lamp that did not have an on-off switc~.
the bulb having been wrapped in newspaper and placed inside a
plastic photo developer-type tray
This device was sent to the
ATF labs in San Francisco and their experts determined said
device to be of the type used by arsonists to start fires
The compnnents of the de\'ice were reconstructed using ne.,,.;
materials. and tests nm bv arson investigators and ATF expe:r:::s
to determine the times during which an ignition of the st.:.rround:..:1f:
newspaper and materials would take place once the lamp had
electrical power placed to it
1

(continued on Page Three)
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Times to ignition, depending on the wattage of the light bulb
ranged at approximately 8-10 hours, .,.;hi ch would be sufficient
tiwe for defendants to establish an alibi of being in Califot111a
There l.lere no signs of vandalism and 1 or rllIIIlilaging through
personal contents indicative of theft
On December 30, 1980 and in accompanying insurance statements, the defendants submitted their insurance proofs of loss
to the insurance company which totalled $444,489 88 of losses
to structural and contents losses.
Among the many items clair..td
that were not fol.D1d in the structure after the fire was $17,000
in silverplate and sterling silver plates and dishes.
In
comparing the defendants' inventory of property with where the
defendants claimed they purchased same, investigators could not
find any records to indicate
that the defendants had ever purchased the items claimed
Dollar amounts on these iterr~ were in
excess of $20,000 in false claims
The defendants had listed the residence for sale on three
separate occasions, with the first listing on May 15, 1980 ~ith
Sugarhouse Realty
No offers were ever made on the house prior
to the fire.
Several second mortgages were taken out against
the property after the sales listing, with payments on the second
mortgage alone costing $1375 per month with that representing
interest only,
and a balloon payment at the end of six months
for $75,000, said balloon payment to have been due Februar:,;r 22,
19 81
Defendants, prior to the fire, were behind on their pa:rments.
and on one occasion defendant Richard Nickles actually stopped
payment on the check
Three days prior to the fire, the stop
payment notice on the $1375 was received by his bank
Reason for
stop payment was ''to pay off loan in full".
Only $1..375 to date
has been paid on this $75,000 second mcrtgage
On November 4, 1930, the defendant Richard !Hckles took a
polygraph test as to his involvement with setting the fire
including a question "did he take part in or cause fire to be
set". The defendant showed deception as to all questions involving
his participation in and/or knowledge of the fire
Defendant Richard Nickles has had two prior fires, one of
which occurred at his boat plant on 2100 South in 1972 in which
arson was determined as the cause and "trailers" and large
quantities of Acetone were used to set the fire
Defendant.
at that time, collected approximately $165,000 in insurance
proceeds from that fire
In a boat fire that occurred in
July, 1979, defendant Richard Nickles collected $70,000 in
insurance proceeds from that fire
Both defendants participated
in the preparation of the insurance claim and proof of their
individual alibis.
The first mortgage on the Crest Oak residence had only
approximately $13,000 owing
Realtors employed by the !lickles'
stated that the sales price was over-stated by defendants, and
the property appraised at $100,000 less than it was insured for
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APPENDIX B

rnsTRUCTION NO.

I c..,

Before you can convict the defendantsof the crime of
AGGRAVATED ARSO!l (Count I)

0 ~ must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all
f the following elements of that crime

1

That on or about the 30th dav of October, 1980,

- Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Richard Hatfield Nickles and
~r?aret

Kav Nickles, either:
a.

intentionally and unlawfully damaged a

structure by fire and/or explosion, or
b.

acting with the required mental state for

the corrnnission of said offense did solicit, request,
command, encourage. or intentionallv aid another
person to engage in conduct to intentionally and
unlawfully damage a structure by fire and/or
explosion.
2.

That said structure was a habitable structure.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and
of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
;·cue; 1

it is your duty to convict the defendant.

On the other

hand, if the evidence has faird to so establish one or morl'
said elements then you

111 vi>

find the defendant not guiltv.

"r

INSTRL'CTIO~

NO.

/

~

°i'·''• are instructed that every person,

acting v:i r:·. the ment2l

., required for the commission of an offense '-<'ho directlv cOTTLl..i:s
:;'fense, who solicites, requests,
~allv

conr.ands, encourages, or inte:c-

aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes

rfense shall be criminally liable as a party for

s~c~

cond~=t

rnsTRUCTION NO.

I~

Before you can convict the defendants of the crime of
INSURANCE FRAUD (Count II)
,cu

must find fror.i the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all

of the following eler.ients of that crime

1.

:o,

That on or between October 30, 1980, and February

1981, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the said

Richard Hatfield Nickles and Margaret Kay Nickles, either·
a

presented or caused to be presented a false

or fraudulent insurance claim to American National
Fire Insurance Company for payment of a loss
covered by insurance; or
b. solicited, requested, cormnanded, encouraged,
or aided each other or another person to present,
or cause to be presented, a false or fraudulent
claim, or any proof of loss in support of any
false or fraudulent claim to American National
Fire Insurance Company for payment of a loss
covered by insurance.
2.

That the said Richard Hatfield Nickles and Margaret

Kay Nickles acted with the intent, or knowingly, to defraud
3.

That the value of the proper°fy falsely or fraudelently

:laimed exceeded $1, 000. 00.

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and
'-

1

of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable

doi~t. it is your dutv to convict the defendant.
c.and, if the: evidence

saiJ elements then you

On the other

ha1{~//f-d to so establish one·
find the defendant not

or·

niorc· " I

~uiltv

T'

·c=-~

"fc-a,_;d" or

"fraudu~cnt"

ir. the ccntext cf

an instance or act of trickery or dccei:, an
~._ ;;:E~. 1 ;,

c

e _;

in~~=~n~

~xccss~ve
,~

s

or ar. int cntional misre;:oreser;tation for the

<: ~)

an0thcr in re:iance upon it to part

is defined as characterized by or

c: :-: c: c e :: :._ n g th e us ua 1 , pro;) er , or r.:::: ::-:--:--. a 1

Excessi\'e
._, :-~.c re.J~ ~':iablc,
•_,.

:

pres~nt

US'__lCJ.l,

descri~Jes

v:;1atc·.:cr :.c:a.'ui~,.·

proper, necessary,

just cir

~

''Estimate" is defined as an opinion, a rough or approximate
,:~,;'.acion

of the cost of an itec:i.

--How <],, you explain that?
2.3 times is an air exchange regardless of

A.

whci!'s inside the house.
, 1

That is inherent property of that

11cular structure due to the way it was built.
If there has been testimony that upstairs is

chanJiny the acetone quantities P1uch more readily than the

lowrr areas,

rr

""· he is

,,

We' 11 ha\'C

if we could sustain a fuel explosion down
M?.

BROl-l:-; :

MR.

CHRISTI:NSE'.'l:

MR.

BROWN:

Aroume'1tati\'e.
He's rendering the opinion.

It's beyond this man's

is an engineer relati\'e to the air exchange itself.,
another witness on the other aspect.
MR, CHRISTENSEN:

q

~xprrtise.

his exrertise,

stipulate that it's beyond

your Honor, but I asked a specific question

He has been testifying about fuel-air exchange

anJ his explanation should be the same regardless of upstair~

'2

I

think it's appropriate to ask this expert --

c1~

dc1v.:r.stairs.

r1c

is an expert.

THE COl'RT:

The obJection will be overruled.

(By Mr. Christensen)

ex~.

Go ahead.

A.

Could you repeat the question?

\I

Yes.

There has been testimony that a fuel-air

>ton occurred downstairs in the Nickles'
w~s

residence but

no e\'idence of that upstairs in the Nickles'

:er.ct-.

1609
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A.

Yes.

Q

Hov.· do you explain that in terms of the

.. •:. har:'jC of air that has taken place in that house?
MR.

BROWN:

Your Honor,

I'm going to obJect

to that again on a different ground afte1 he rephrased the
que~tion

because there is evidence that there was an

exj·losion upstairs as well as dov.·nstairs and that's
"·ls J ea d l ng .

THE COURT:
'O

as to the form of the question.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

11

i2

lo

No further questions of this

v.11tness.

'l'HE COURT:

Anything further of this witness?

MR. BROWN:

Nothing further of this witness,

THE COURT:

You may be excused, Mr. Aalam.

vour Hu nor,

1·

THE WITNESS:
THE CLERK:

/Ir

/I

The obJection will be sustained

Thank you,
Would you raise yo·,ir right hand,

You do solemnly swear the testimony you
ilre

about to give will be the truth,

c0th1nu but the trath,

so help you God?

DIANA NICKLES:
MR.
i11q

the whole truth, and

BROWN:

I

do.

Perhaps, your Honor,

rather than

Diana testify at this time, we' 11 ha·:e a different
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

Before you can convict the Defendant, Richard H. Nickles, of
C'l inir

of INSURANCE FRAUD, you must find from the evidence,

n1 a reasonable doubt, all of the followina elements of that

That on or about the 30th day of October and the 30th day
Derember, 1980,
~_r1ard

in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the said

H. Nickles did present or cause to be presented a false or

•raudulenl insurance claim to Great American Insurance Comoany for
r·e/rnent of a loss covered by insurance; and
2.

That the said Richard H. Nickles acted with the intent,

:r knowingly,
3.

to defraud.

That the value of the property falsely or fraudulently

:ldirned exceeded $1,000.00.
4.

That there was a contract of insurance in effect at the

:.1me the purported claim was

5.

filed.

That said submissions were more than "estimates".

If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of
c~e

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it

is your duty to convict the Defendant.

On the other hand, if the

e·:1de:ice has failed to so establish one or more of said elements
ueyond a reasonable doubt,

then you must find the De fend ant not qui 1 ty.

